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Abstract—We systematize software side-channel attacks with
a focus on vulnerabilities and countermeasures in the cryp-
tographic implementations. Particularly, we survey past re-
search literature to categorize vulnerable implementations,
and identify common strategies to eliminate them. We then
evaluate popular libraries and applications, quantitatively
measuring and comparing the vulnerability severity, re-
sponse time and coverage. Based on these characterizations
and evaluations, we offer some insights for side-channel
researchers, cryptographic software developers and users.
We hope our study can inspire the side-channel research
community to discover new vulnerabilities, and more im-
portantly, to fortify applications against them.
1. Introduction
Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat
to computer applications and systems. They exploit the
vulnerabilities in the implementations instead of the al-
gorithms. Vulnerable implementations can exhibit input-
dependent non-functional behaviors at runtime, which can
be observed by an adversary to fully or partially recover
the sensitive input. Over the past few years, numerous
side-channel vulnerabilities were discovered and exploited
to defeat modern cryptographic schemes, allowing adver-
saries to break strong ciphers in a short period of time
with very few trials.
Defeating side-channel vulnerabilities has been a long-
standing goal for providing robust cryptographic protec-
tion. Although security-aware systems [1–6] and archi-
tectures [7–11] were designed to mitigate side-channel
attacks, a more efficient and practical approach is to elimi-
nate side-channel sources from software implementations.
Various tools and methods were proposed to facilitate cre-
ating software free of side channels [12, 13] or verifying
their non-existence [14–19]. It is however still very chal-
lenging to remove all side-channel vulnerabilities from
critical implementations, since cryptographic applications
usually have a large code base and high performance
requirement. As such, the arms race between side-channel
attacks and defenses remains heated.
Past several decades have seen a large amount of
literature about side-channel vulnerabilities. Meanwhile,
various open-source libraries and commercial products
have introduced different mitigation solutions. Thus, it
becomes necessary to systematize the knowledge about
the characteristics and evolution of these vulnerabilities
and countermeasures. We are particularly interested in
three questions: (1) What are the common and distinct
features of various vulnerabilities? (2) What are common
mitigation strategies? (3) What is the status quo of cryp-
tographic applications regarding side-channel vulnerabili-
ties? Past work only surveyed attack techniques and media
[20–31], without offering unified summaries for software
vulnerabilities and countermeasures that are more useful.
This paper provides a comprehensive characterization
of side-channel vulnerabilities and countermeasures, as
well as evaluations of cryptographic applications related
to side-channel attacks. We present this study in three di-
rections. (1) Systematization of literature: we characterize
the vulnerabilities from past work with regard to the im-
plementations; for each vulnerability, we describe the root
cause and the technique required to launch a successful
attack. (2) Identification and abstraction of key counter-
measure techniques: we summarize the common strategies
to mitigate different categories of vulnerabilities; we also
explore and compare the effectiveness of each counter-
measure implementation under different threat models. (3)
Evaluation of cryptographic applications: we perform a
timeline analysis of side-channel vulnerabilities and the
corresponding patches in various libraries and products,
and evaluate the vulnerability severity, patch release speed
and coverage from a practical perspective.
Scope. There are generally two types of side-channel
attacks. In software attacks, an adversary interacts with
the victim application through a local malicious program
or over the network to collect information such as exe-
cution time [32, 33] and memory access pattern [34] for
recovering the victim’s secrets. Such vulnerabilities are
usually caused by critical control flow or data flow leak-
age. In physical attacks, an adversary physically interferes
with the victim’s execution (e.g., fault injection [35]) or
approaches the victim to collect physical signals such as
acoustic emission [36], electromagnetic radiation [37, 38]
and power trace [39, 40]. The adversary utilizes special
analysis (e.g., power analysis [41, 42]) to obtain finer
grained information (e.g., intermediate values, Hamming
weights) than control flow or data flow. In this paper,
we mainly focus on software attacks, which are more ex-
ploitable and common. Physical attacks and vulnerabilities
are out of the scope of this paper.
Contributions. The main purpose of this work is to help
researchers, software developers and users better under-
stand the status quo and future direction of side-channel
research and countermeasure development. Based on our
systematization, we: 1) propose three possible directions
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for researchers to consider in their future exploration; 2)
provide three recommendations for developers to follow
in security enhancement of their applications against side-
channel attacks; 3) identify three indications for users
to utilize in selecting libraries and implementations most
suitable for their usage scenarios. The key contributions
of this paper are:
• Characterization of side-channel vulnerabilities in im-
plementations of cryptographic operations (Sec. 3).
• Identification and dissection of common countermea-
sure technique designs (Sec. 4).
• Evaluation of cryptographic applications, and analysis
of vulnerabilities and countermeasures (Sec. 5).
• Insights and recommendations for side-channel re-
searchers, software developers and users (Sec. 6).
2. Background
2.1. Basics of Cryptography
2.1.1. Asymmetric Cryptography. Each user has a pub-
lic key that is widely distributed and a private key that
is kept to herself. This pair of keys can be used for data
encryption/decryption and digital signature.
RSA [43]. Two different large prime numbers, p and q,
and an integer e, are chosen to satisfy that gcd(p−1, e) =
1 and gcd(q − 1, e) = 1. Let N = pq and d = e−1
mod (p−1)(q−1), then the public key is the tuple (N, e),
and the private key is d. For a message m, the ciphertext
is calculated as c ≡ me mod N . For a ciphertext c, the
message is decrypted as m ≡ cd mod N . The security
of RSA relies on the difficulty of factoring large integers.
ElGamal [44]. A large cyclic group G is chosen. Let q be
its order, g be its generator, x be a random positive integer
smaller than q, and h = gx, then the public key is the tuple
(G, q, g, h), and the private key is x. To encrypt a message
m, one chooses a random positive integer smaller than q,
denoted by y, and calculate the ciphertext as (gy,m ·hy).
To decrypt a ciphertext (c1, c2), one can compute m =
c2 ·(cx1)−1. The security of ElGamal relies on the difficulty
of solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [45, 46]. An ellip-
tic curve group is chosen with prime order p and generator
G. Let k be a random positive integer smaller than p, then
k is the private key, and the public key is D = kG. To
encrypt a message m, one encodes m to a point M on the
curve, chooses a random positive integer r, and calculate
the ciphertext as two points (M + rD, rG). To decrypt a
ciphertext (C1, C2), one can compute M = C1kC2, and
decode point M to message m. The security of ECC relies
on the difficulty of solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem. Appendix A.1 has more details.
2.1.2. Symmetric Cryptography. A single key is used
in both data encryption and decryption, and is shared
between two users. Digital signature cannot supported.
AES-128. During key setup, a 16-byte secret key k =
(k0, ..., k15) is expanded into 11 round keys while the
initial round key is just the original key itself. Given
a 16-byte plaintext p = (p0, ..., p15), encryption pro-
ceeds by computing a 16-byte intermediate state x(r) =
(x
(r)
0 , ..., x
(r)
15 ) at each round r as a 4 × 4 matrix. The
initial state is computed as x(0)i = pi ⊕ ki (i = 0, ..., 15),
known as AddRoundKey. Each of the following 9
rounds consists of SubBytes (byte substitution based
on a lookup table), ShiftRows (transposition of bytes
within each of the three last rows in the 4 × 4 matrix),
MixColumns (matrix multiplication to make each byte
represents a weighted sum of all bytes in its column)
and AddRoundKey operations. The final round has only
SubBytes, ShiftRow and AddRoundKey operations,
and its output is the ciphertext.
2.1.3. Post-Quantum Cryptography. This cipher family
was proposed to sustain attacks by a quantum computer.
One popular scheme is lattice-based cryptography.
NTRU [47]. It utilizes simple polynomial multiplication
in the ring of truncated polynomials Zq[X]/(XN − 1).
For encryption, the private key consists of a pair of
polynomials f and g, and the public key h = p · f−1q · g
mod q, where f−1q denotes the inverse of f modulo q.
To encrypt a message m, one needs to compute a hash
function r = G(m) and m′ = m⊕H(r ·h mod q). Then
the ciphertext is e = (r · h + m′) mod q. To decrypt
the message, one needs to first recover m′ = ((f · e
mod q) mod p) · f−1p mod p and then the plaintext is
computed as M = m′⊕H(e−m′ mod q). The security
of NTRU relies on the difficulty of solving the shortest
vector problem in a lattice.
Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) [48]. To generate
a key pair, one needs to create a polynomial a ∈ Rq with
coefficients chosen uniformly in Zq, sample two polyno-
mials r1, r2 ∈ Rq from χ and compute p = r1−a·r2 ∈ Rq.
Then the public key is (a, p) and the private key is
r2. To encrypt a message m, one needs to first encode
m to a polynomial m, and sample three polynomials
e1, e2, e3 ∈ Rq from χ. Then the ciphertext is (c1, c2),
where c1 = a ·e1+e2 and c2 = p ·e1+e3+m. To decrypt
the message, one needs to compute m′ = c1 ·r2+c2 ∈ Rq
and decode the coefficients of m′ to either 0 or 1.
Bimodal Lattice Signature Scheme (BLISS) [49]. The
private key is S = (s1, s2) where s1, s2 ∈ Zq[X]/(XN −
1) and the corresponding public key is A = (2aq, q − 2)
mod 2q where aq = s2/s1. To sign a message µ, two
blinding values y1, y2 ∈ R are sampled from a discrete
Gaussian distribution. A hash value is computed as c =
H(bued mod p, µ), where u = ζ · 2aqy1 + y2 mod 2q,
and ζ = (1/(q − 2)) mod 2q. The signature is then the
triple (c, z1, z2), with zi = yi+(−1)bsi ·c mod 2q, where
b is a random bit. Signature verification is performed by
checking c = H(bζ · 2aq · z1+ ζ · q · ced+ z2 mod p, µ).
2.1.4. Cryptographic Protocol. SSL/TLS allows a server
and a client to use the handshake protocol to exchange
a symmetric key K, which they use for later secure
communications. More details about the protocol can be
found in Appendix A.2.
Key exchange. RSA is commonly adopted to exchange
the symmetric key K, following Public Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS). The client generates a random non-
zero padding string pad that is at least 8 bytes, creates a
block 0x00||0x02||pad||0x00||K, encrypts it using RSA
and sends the ciphertext to the server. When the server
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if s = 1 then
r ← foo()
else
r ← bar()
return r
(a) Control flow vulnerability
Pre-compute:
T [0] = foo(0)
· · ·
T [m− 1] = foo(m− 1)
r = T [s]
return r
(b) Data flow vulnerability
Fig. 1: Side-channel vulnerabilities
decrypts the ciphertext, she accepts this message only
when the first two bytes are 0x00 and 0x02, and next
8 bytes are non-zero. Then she searches for 0x00 in the
remaining data, and everything after that will be the key.
Hash and encryption. After the key is established,
standard network protocols adopt CBC-MAC to encrypt
messages. (1) Message Authentication Code (MAC) is
calculated over the sequence number SEQ, header HDR
and message m. (2) The plaintext P is created by concate-
nating m, the MAC from step (1), and a padding string
pad, which is chosen to make the byte length of P a
multiple of the block size b. (3) P is divided into blocks
of b bytes, each block encrypted with key K. (4) The final
message is the concatenation of HDR and all encrypted
blocks. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext in CBC mode
and validates the padding format and the MAC. If both
are correct, she accepts the original intact message m.
2.2. Basics of Side-channel Attacks
Side-channel attacks enable adversaries to steal secrets
by exploiting observable information from the applica-
tion’s execution. When the application takes a secret input
X , the host system or application shows a runtime char-
acteristic Y , which can be captured by an adversary. By
identifying the correlation Y ∼ X , the adversary is able
to infer the secret input via the side-channel information.
2.2.1. Vulnerabilities. The root cause of side-channel at-
tacks is that application’s runtime behavior depends on the
secrets. Generally there are two types of leakage sources:
Secret-dependent control flow. When the secret s is
different, the program executes a different code path and
invokes a different function (Figure 1a). This yields dif-
ferent runtime behaviors distinguishable by the adversary.
Secret-dependent data flow. A program may access data
whose locations are determined by the secret s (Figure
1b). The memory access pattern allows the adversary to
make educated guesses about the secret value.
2.2.2. Techniques. Another key factor for a successful
side-channel attack is the technique to capture useful char-
acteristics of the application or the system. We consider
two types of software-based techniques and approaches.
Network-level attacks. The remote adversary connects
to the victim application via networks. Thus, side-channel
information may exist in the responses from the victim
such as message content [50, 51], packet size [52] and
response time [53, 54].
Host-level attacks. The malicious program and the victim
application run on the same platform, and thus share the
same micro-architectural units. Contention on these units
can disclose the victim’s runtime behaviors to the adver-
sary. Researchers have designed a large quantity of attack
techniques based on various hardware units including CPU
cache [34, 55], branch predictor [56] and TLB [57].
3. Characterization of Vulnerabilities
We systematically characterize side-channel vulner-
abilities from past work based on different operations
in different cryptographic ciphers and protocols. Table 1
summarizes the vulnerabilities we will describe. For each
vulnerability, we present the vulnerable operations, causes
and the corresponding attacks (types, techniques, side-
channel information granularities).
3.1. Asymmetric Cryptography
3.1.1. Modular Multiplication. Given three integers x,
y and m, this operation is to calculate x ∗ y mod m.
Naive and Karatsuba multiplications. Both OpenSSL
and GnuPG implement two multiplication routines: naive
multiplication and Karatsuba multiplication [105]. The
routine is selected based on the size of the operands: the
naive routine is adopted for multiplicands of small sizes,
while Karatsuba routine is adopted for large multiplicands.
Such implementation introduces control-flow side
channels about the operands: Karatsuba routine is typ-
ically faster than the native routine. An adversary can
measure the execution time to infer the sizes of the
operands, and then recover the secret key [58].
3.1.2. Modular Exponentiation/Scalar Multiplication.
We consider the two operations together as they share
similar implementations and vulnerabilities. Modular ex-
ponentiation is to calculate xy mod m, where x, y and
m are three integers. Scalar multiplication is to calculate
yx where y is a scalar and x is a point on the elliptic
curve. The implementations of these two operations can
reveal the secret key y in RSA and ElGamal, or secret
scalar y in ECC via side channels.
Square-and-Multiply/Double-and-Add [106, 107]. The
calculation of modular exponentiation is converted into
a sequence of SQUARE and MULTIPLY operations. The
binary representation of y is denoted as yn−1yn−2...y0.
Then starting from n − 1 to 0, for each bit yi, SQUARE
is called. If yi is 1, MULTIPLY is also called. Simi-
larly, scalar multiplication is converted into a sequence
of PointDouble and PointAdd based on each bit yi.
Such implementations are vulnerable to control-flow
side-channel attacks: the execution of MULTIPLY or
PointAdd depends on bit yi. By observing the traces of
SQUARE and MULTIPLY in modular exponentiation, or
PointDouble and PointAdd in scalar multiplication,
an adversary can fully recover y. Successful attacks have
been demonstrated against RSA in GnuPG via cache
PRIME-PROBE [60, 61] and FLUSH-RELOAD [59] tech-
niques, and against EdDSA via TLB side-channel [57].
Square-and-Multiply-always/Double-and-Add-always
[107]. For modular exponentiation, this implementation
always executes both SQUARE and MULTIPLY operations
for each bit. It selects the output of SQUARE if yi is 0,
and the output of MULTIPLY following SQUARE if yi is
3
TABLE 1: Side-channel vulnerabilities. (: control flow, : data flow;  : host-level, #: network-level)
Category Operation Implementation Application Cause Type Granularity Ref Index
Modular Multiplication Basic and Karatsuba multiplication RSA  # Execution time [58] 1.1.1.a
Square-and-Multiply RSA   Cacheline (FLUSH-RELOAD) [59] 1.2.1.a
Double-and-Add ElGamal   Cacheline (PRIME-PROBE) [60, 61] 1.2.1.bEdDSA   Memory Page (TLB) [57] 1.2.1.c
Square-and-Multiply-always RSA   Branch [62] 1.2.2.a
Double-and-Add-always RSA   Memory Page (TLB) [57] 1.2.2.b
Sliding window
RSA   Cacheline (PRIME-PROBE) [55] 1.2.3.a
RSA   Cacheline (FLUSH-RELOAD) [63] 1.2.3.b
ECDSA   Cacheline (FLUSH-RELOAD) [64–67] 1.2.3.c
ECDSA   micro-operation (Execution Port) [68] 1.2.3.d
Asymmetric Modular Exponentiation RSA   Cacheline (PRIME-PROBE) [69] 1.2.3.e
Cryptography Scalar Multiplication ElGamal   Cacheline (PRIME-PROBE) [61] 1.2.3.f
ECDSA   Cacheline (PRIME-PROBE) [70] 1.2.3.g
Fixed window RSA   Cache bank [71] 1.2.4.a
Montgomery ladder ECDSA   Cacheline (FLUSH-RELOAD) [72] 1.2.6.aECDSA  # Execution time [73] 1.2.6.b
Branchless montgomery ladder
ECDH   Cacheline (FLUSH-RELOAD) [74] 1.2.6.a
ECDH   Cacheline (FLUSH-RELOAD) [75] 1.2.7.b
ECDH  # Execution time [76] 1.2.7.c
Modular Inverse Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm
RSA   Branch [56] 1.3.1.a
RSA   Memory Page (Controlled-channel) [77] 1.3.1.b
RSA   Cacheline (FLUSH-RELOAD) [78] 1.3.1.c
Substitution-Permutation T-box lookup
AES   Cacheline (PRIME-PROBE) [34] 2.1.1.a
Symmetric AES   Cacheline (EVICT-TIME) [34] 2.1.1.b
Cryptography AES   Cache (FLUSH-RELOAD) [79, 80] 2.1.1.c
AES  # Execution time [32, 33] 2.1.1.d
Post-Quantum Distribution Sampling
Cumulative Distribution Table sampling BLISS   Cacheline (FLUSH-RELOAD) [81, 82] 3.1.1.a
Cryptography
Rejection sampling BLISS   Cacheline (FLUSH-RELOAD) [81, 82] 3.1.2.aBLISS   Branch [83, 84] 3.1.2.b
Failure Rate Reduction Error Correcting Code Ring-LWE  # Execution time [85] 3.2.1.a
Message Randomization Padding-Hash NTRU  # Execution time [86] 3.3.1.a
RSA-PAD
Error message
SSL  # Network message [50, 87] 4.1.1.a
SSLv3.0, TLSv1.0  # Network message [88] 4.1.1.b
TLS  # Network message [89] 4.1.1.c
IKE  # Network message [90] 4.1.1.d
Uniform response message
TLSv1.0  # Execution time [53] 4.1.2.a
SSLv2.0  # Network message [91] 4.1.2.b
TLS   Page, Cacheline, Branch [92] 4.1.2.c
TLS   Cacheline (FLUSH-RELOAD), Branch [93] 4.1.2.d
XML Encryption  # Network message [94] 4.1.2.e
XML Encryption  # Execution time [94] 4.1.2.f
Cryptographic XML Encryption   Cacheline (FLUSH-RELOAD) [95] 4.1.2.g
Protocol
CBC-MAC-PAD
Error message
IPSec, WTLS, SSH2  # Network message [51] 4.2.1.a
SSLv3.0  # Network message [96] 4.2.1.b
IPSec  # Network message [97, 98] 4.2.1.c
Web apps  # Network message [99] 4.2.1.d
ASP.NET  # Network message [100] 4.2.1.e
Uniform response message TLSv1.0  # Execution time [101] 4.2.2.aTLSv1.1  # Execution time [54] 4.2.2.b
Dummy MAC checking TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1  # Execution time [102] 4.2.3.a
Constant-time compression
TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2   Cacheline (FLUSH-RELOAD) [103] 4.2.4.a
TLS   Page, Cacheline, Branch [92] 4.2.4.b
TLS   Cacheline (PRIME-PROBE) [104] 4.2.4.c
1. Similarly, Double-and-Add-always was proposed for
scalar multiplication in ECC.
This implementation executes a fixed number of
SQUARE and MULTIPLY operations for modular expo-
nentiation, or PointDouble and PointAdd operations
for scalar multiplication, defeating remote timing attacks.
However output selection still requires a secret-dependent
branch, which is usually smaller than one cache line. If
it fits within the same cache line with preceding and
succeeding code, then it is not vulnerable to host-level
attacks. However, Doychev and Ko¨pf [62] showed that
for Libgcrypt, some compiler options can put this branch
into separate cache lines, making this implementation
vulnerable to cache-based attacks. Gras et al. [57] showed
that this branch can put into separate pages, and the
implementation is subject to TLB-based attacks.
Sliding window [108]. For modular exponentiation, the
exponent y is represented as a sequence of windows di.
Each window starts and ends with bit 1, and the window
length cannot exceed a fixed parameter w. So the value
of any window is an odd number between 1 and 2w − 1.
This method pre-computes xv mod m for each odd value
v ∈ [1, 2w− 1], and stores these results in a table indexed
by i ∈ [0, (v−1)/2]. Then it scans every window, squares
and multiplies the corresponding entry in the table.
Similarly, for scalar multiplication, the scalar y is rep-
resented as a w-ary non-adjacent form (wNAF), with each
window value di ∈ {0,±1, ...,±(2w−1 − 1)}. It first pre-
computes the values of {1, 3, ..., 2w−1 − 1}x, and stores
them into a table. Then it scans each window, doubles and
adds djx if dj > 0 or subtracts (−dj)x otherwise.
Two types of vulnerabilities exist in such implemen-
tations. The first one is secret-dependent control flow:
different routines will be called depending on whether
a window is zero. By monitoring the execution trace of
those branches, the adversary learns if each window is
zero, and further recovers the secret. Such attacks have
been realized against RSA [55, 63] and ECDSA [64–68].
The second one is secret-dependent data flow: the
access location in the pre-computed table is determined by
each window value. By observing the access pattern, the
adversary is able to recover each window value. Attacks
exploiting this vulnerability have been mounted against
RSA [69], ElGamal [61] and ECDSA [70].
Fixed window [109]. This method was designed to
approach true constant-time implementation. Similar to
sliding window, it also divides the secret y into a set of
windows, pre-computes the exponentiation or multiplica-
tion of each window value, and stores the results in a
table. The differences are that the window size is fixed as
w, and the table stores both odd and even (including zero)
values. It removes the critical control flow branch at the
cost of more memory and slower run time.
To remove critical data flow, this approach can be com-
bined with scatter-gather memory layout technique [110],
which stores the pre-computed values in different cache
4
lines instead of consecutive memory locations. Specifi-
cally, each window value is stored across multiple cache
lines, and each cache line stores parts of multiple window
values. When MULTIPLY or PointAdd is executed,
multiple cache lines are fetched to reconstruct the window
value, hiding the access pattern from the adversary.
This implementation is still vulnerable to attacks [71]
using cache bank, the minimal data access unit in caches.
Concurrent requests can be served in parallel if they target
different cache banks even in the same cache line, but have
to be served sequentially if they target the same cache
bank. The timing difference between the two cases enables
the adversary to infer the window values accessed during
the gathering phase, and then recover the secret bits.
Masked window. This approach was derived from fixed
window implementation to further hide the cache bank
access patterns. The idea is to access all window values
instead of just the one needed, and then use a mask to
filter out unused data. It performs a constant sequence
of memory accesses, and has been proven secure against
different types of cache-based attacks [62].
Montgomery ladder [111, 112]. This is a variation
of Double-and-Add-always for scalar multiplication. It
also represents y in the binary form and conducts both
PointAdd and PointDouble functions for each bit,
irrespective of the bit value. The outputs of these func-
tions are assigned to the intermediate variables determined
by the bit value. A difference from Double-and-Add-
always is that in Montgomery ladder, the parameter of
PointDouble is also determined by the bit value.
This implementation contains branches depending on
the secret values. Yarom and Benger [72] adopted cache
FLUSH-RELOAD technique to identify the branch patterns
and attack ECDSA in OpenSSL. Brumley and Tuveri
[73] discovered that the implementation in OpenSSL 0.9.8
loops from the most significant non-zero bit in y to 0. So
the number of iterations is proportional to log(y). This
presents a vulnerability for remote timing attacks.
Branchless Montgomery ladder [113]. This approach
replaces branches in Montgomery ladder with a function
that uses bitwise logic to swap two intermediate values
only if the bit is 1, and thus removes the timing chan-
nel. However, the implementations of PointAdd and
PointDouble can still bring side channels.
First, OpenSSL adopts a lookup table to accelerate the
square operation in the two functions. The access pattern
to the table can leak information about the secret in ECDH
[74]. Second, the modulo operation of x mod m in the
two functions adopted the early exit implementation: if
x is smaller than m, x is directly returned. This branch
can be exploited by the adversary to check whether x is
smaller than m, and then deduce secrets in EDH [75].
Third, Kaufmann et al. [76] discovered that in Windows
OS, the multiplication function of two 64-bit integers has
an operand-dependent branch: if both operands have their
32 least significant bits equal to 0, then the multiplication
is skipped and the result will be 0. This early exit branch
was exploited to attack ECDH.
3.1.3. Modular Inverse. This operation is to calculate the
integer x−1m such that xx
−1
m ≡ 1 mod m. It can also be
used to check if two integers, p and q, are co-prime.
Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm [109]. This ap-
proach uses arithmetic shift, comparison and subtraction
to replace division. It is particularly efficient for big
integers, but suffers from control flow vulnerabilities due
to the introduction of operand-dependent branches. Branch
prediction [56] attacks was demonstrated to recover the
value of m in ECDSA and RSA. Page fault [77] and cache
FLUSH-RELOAD [78] techniques were adopted to attack
the gcd operation in RSA key generation.
Euclidean Extended Algorithm. This approach calcu-
lates quotients and remainders in each step without intro-
ducing secret-dependent branches. It is less efficient but
secure against control flow side-channel attacks.
3.2. Symmetric Cryptography
In addition to asymmetric ciphers, symmetric ciphers,
e.g., AES, can also be vulnerable to side-channel attacks.
3.2.1. Substitution-Permutation. This is a series of
linked mathematical operations used in block ciphers. It
takes a block of the plaintext and the key as inputs, and ap-
plies several alternating “rounds” of substitution boxes and
permutation boxes to produce the ciphertext block. For
AES, it consists of four basic operations: ShiftRows,
MixColumns, SubBytes and AddRoundKey.
T-box lookup. This approach converts the algebraic oper-
ations in each round into lookup table accesses. For AES,
there are 8 pre-computed tables: T0, T1, T2, T3 are used in
the first 9 rounds and T 101 , T
10
2 , T
10
3 , T
10
0 are used in the
final round. Each table contains 256 4-byte words. Then
each round can be computed by updating the intermediate
states with certain words from the corresponding tables.
Since the accessed entries of the lookup tables are
determined by the secret keys and plaintexts, an adversary
can capture such access patterns to infer secrets. Local
cache attacks were proposed using PRIME-PROBE [34],
EVICT-TIME [34] and FLUSH-RELOAD [79, 80] tech-
niques. Remote timing attacks were proposed [32, 33] due
to cache access collisions.
3.3. Post-Quantum Cryptography
Although post-quantum cryptography is secure against
quantum computer based attacks, the implementations of
those algorithms can contain side-channel vulnerabilities,
which can be attacked even by a conventional computer.
3.3.1. Distribution Sampling. This operation is to sample
an integer from a distribution. It is essential for BLISS
[49] to make the signature statistically independent of
the secrets. However, an adversary can adopt side-channel
attacks to recover the sampled data, and hence the secrets.
Cumulative Distribution Table (CDT) Sampling [114].
BLISS needs to sample blinding values from a discrete
Gaussian distribution, and add them to the signature. The
CDT sampling approach pre-computes a table T[i] =
P[x ≤ i|x ∼ Dσ]. At the sampling phase, a random
number r is uniformly chosen from [0, 1), and the target
i is identified from T that satisfies r ∈ [T [i − 1], T [i]).
Some implementations adopt a guide table I to restrict
the search space and accelerate the search process.
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The access pattern to the two tables reveals informa-
tion about the sampled values. An adversary can adopt
cache FLUSH-RELOAD technique to recover the blinding
values, and further the secret key in BLISS [81, 82].
Rejection Sampling [115]. This approach samples a
bit from a Bernoulli distribution B(exp(−x/2σ2)). The
implementation can bring side-channel opportunities for
stealing the secret x: (1) a lookup table ET[i] =
exp(−2i/(2σ2)) is pre-computed to accelerate the bit
sampling, causing a data flow vulnerability; (2) the sam-
pling process needs to iterate over each secret bit and
different branches will be executed for different bit values,
producing a control flow vulnerability.
Practical attacks were demonstrated exploiting those
vulnerabilities. First, rejection sampling can replace CDT
sampling for blinding value generation. An adversary
could utilize cache [81, 82] or branch [83] based attacks
to recover the sampled values in BLISS. Second, this
approach can also be used to sample random bits to
probabilistically determine whether the blinding value is
positive or negative, and whether the signature should be
accepted or rejected. An adversary can infer the secret
from this process via cache or branch traces [83, 84].
3.3.2. Failure Rate Reduction. Post-quantum schemes
may have certain failure rate during encryption or de-
cryption due to its statistic nature. Thus it is necessary
to devise methods to reduce the possibililty of failure.
Error Correcting Code (ECC). This approach can sig-
nificantly reduce the failure rate, but its implementation
can reveal whether the ciphertext contains an error via
timing channels: a ciphertext without an error is much
faster to decode than one with errors. An adversary can
exploit such information to recover the key [85].
3.3.3. Message Randomization. Some post-quantum
schemes require to randomize the message during encryp-
tion and decryption. This process can also create side-
channel vulnerabilities.
Padding-Hash. In NTRU, encryption and decryption uti-
lize hash functions to randomize the messages. However,
the number of hash function calls highly depends on the
input message. Thus, the total execution time of encryp-
tion or decryption will also differ for different inputs. By
measuring such time information, an adversary is able to
recover the secret input [86].
3.4. Cryptographic Protocol
Side-channel attacks were proposed to target the cryp-
tographic protocols, specifically, the padding mechanism.
3.4.1. RSA-PAD. As introduced in Sec. 2.1.4, network
protocols usually adopt RSA with PKCS. The padding
mechanism can leak information about the plaintexts.
Error message. In the handshake protocol in SSL 3.0,
the receiver decrypts the message, and checks whether it
is PKCS conforming. If so, she continues the handshake
protocol. Otherwise she sends an error message back to
the sender and aborts the connection. This message serves
as a side channel to recover the plaintext. When the sender
sends out a ciphertext, the adversary can intercept the
message and send a modified one to the receiver. From
the receiver’s response, the adversary learns if the first
two bytes of the plaintext corresponding to the modified
ciphertext are 0x00||0x02 (valid PKCS conforming) or not
(invalid PKCS conforming). This can reduce the scope
of the original plaintext. The adversary can repeat this
process until the scope of plaintext is narrowed down to
one single value.
This vulnerability was discovered by Bleichenbacher
[50], followed by variants of such attacks [87, 88]. Large-
scale evaluations showed that it still exists in many real-
world websites, applications [89] and protocols [90].
Uniform response message. A common defense is to
unify the responses for valid and invalid paddings: if the
decrypted message structure is not PKCS conforming, the
receiver generates a random string as the plaintext, and
performs all subsequent handshake computations on it.
Thus, the adversary cannot distinguish valid ciphertexts
from invalid ones based on the responses.
This implementation can still incur side-channel vul-
nerabilities. First, there can be other types of messages
that reveal the validation of padding format. For instance,
in XML encryption, the message is encrypted using CBC
mode, and the symmetric key is encrypted using RSA.
Jager et al. [94] discovered that the response of CBC
encryption can leak whether the RSA padding is correct,
enabling the adversary to recover the symmetric key.
Second, there can be observable timing differences
between valid and invalid padding cases. Meyer et al.
[53] discovered that in OpenSSL and JSSE, the receiver
needs more time to process the ill formatted message,
due to generation of random numbers. Jager et al. [94]
found that in XML encryption, invalid CBC decryption
following valid RSA decryption takes longer time than
invalid RSA decryption.
Third, there can be control flow branches that depend
on whether the message is PKCS conforming, such as
error logging, data conversion and padding verification.
They enable a host-based adversary to monitor the ex-
ecution trace as the oracle. Attacks based on control-
flow inference and cache FLUSH-RELOAD techniques
[92, 93, 95] were designed against different applications.
3.4.2. CBC-MAC-PAD. The CBC-MAC padding scheme
(Sec. 2.1.4) can also incur side-channel vulnerabilities.
Error message. When the receiver gets the ciphertext
in CBC-MAC mode, she decrypts it and validates the
padding format. (1) If the format is invalid, she rejects
the message, and sends a decryption failed error message
to the sender. Otherwise, she checks the MAC value. (2) If
the MAC is incorrect, she returns a bad record mac error
message. (3) Otherwise, the message passes the validation
and is accepted by the receiver. These three conditions
with three different responses create a side channel: an
adversary can modify the ciphertext and send it to the
receiver for decryption. Based on the response, he can
learn whether the chosen ciphertext is decrypted into an
incorrect padding. This oracle enables the adversary to
learn each byte of an arbitrary plaintext block.
This vulnerability was first discovered by Vaudenay
[51]. Mo¨ller et al. [96] designed an variant attack, POO-
DLE, to compromise SSL 3.0. Evaluations on different
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applications [99, 100] and protocols [97, 98] were con-
ducted to show its severity and pervasiveness.
Uniform response message [116]. This solution unifies
the responses for both invalid padding format error and
invalid MAC error, so the adversary cannot know whether
the decrypted ciphertext has a valid padding or not.
Timing channels exist in this approach: if the format
is invalid, the receiver only needs to perform simple
operations on the very end of the ciphertext; otherwise,
she needs to further perform MAC validation throughout
the whole ciphertext, which takes more time. Attacks
exploiting such timing discrepancy between these two
cases were demonstrated against TLS protocol in stunnel
[101], and DTLS in OpenSSL and GnuTLS [54].
Dummy MAC checking. This approach attempts to
remove the timing channel by calling a dummy MAC
validation even when the padding is incorrect. However,
the calculation of MAC over a message M depends on the
message length: it takes more time to compress longer M .
Dummy MAC assumes the plaintext contains no padding,
i.e., longest M . So an adversary can choose the ciphertext
with short length of M to distinguish whether a real or
dummy MAC is performed. AlFardan and Paterson [102]
proposed lucky thirteen attacks, exploiting this vulnerabil-
ity to recover plaintexts in TLS.
Constant-time compression. Different strategies were
designed to achieve constant-time compression implemen-
tations: (1) dummy data can be appended to the padding
for a maximum (i.e., constant) number of MAC compres-
sion operations; (2) extra dummy compression operations
can be added to make MAC validation constant time.
These implementations still contain secret-dependent
control flows, making them vulnerable to host-level at-
tacks. An adversary can obtain the padding validation
results via cache FLUSH-RELOAD [103], PRIME-PROBE
[104] or control-flow inference [92] techniques.
4. Summary of Countermeasures
In this section, we summarize the cryptographic imple-
mentations from the perspective of side-channel defenses.
From Sec. 3 we observe that one implementation may
be secure against one type of attack, but possibly vulnera-
ble to another type of attack. The side-channel resistance
of one implementation highly depends on the adversarial
capabilities, i.e., type and granularity of observable side-
channel information. Table 2 summarizes the effective-
ness of different countermeasure implementations under
different types of attacks, which serves as a reference for
developers and users to select the optimal implementation
based on their security demands and threat models.
The goal of side-channel defenses is to eliminate the
correlation between the application’s secrets and runtime
behaviors. This can be achieved by either unifying or
randomizing the side-channel information. Different ap-
proaches may share common routines and features. Below
we abstract the key features of these techniques.
4.1. Side-channel Information Unification
4.1.1. Remove Control Flow. Control flow vulnerabilities
exist when different values of the secret s lead to different
r1← foo()
r2← bar()
if s = 1 then
r ← r1
else
r ← r2
return r
(a) AlwaysExecute-ConditionalSelect
r1← foo()
r2← bar()
r ← (r1 & s) | (r2 & !s)
return r
(b) AlwaysExecute-BitwiseSelect
Fig. 2: Remove control flow vulnerability
Pre-compute:
T [0] = foo(0)
· · ·
T [m− 1] = foo(m− 1)
for i← 0 to m− 1 do
r ← r | (T [i] & (s = i))
return r
(a) AlwaysAccess-BitwiseSelect
r ← foo(s)
return r
(b) On-the-fly calculation
Fig. 3: Remove data flow vulnerability
code paths distinguishable by the adversary (Figure 1a).
Two strategies can be used to remove such control flow.
AlwaysExecute-ConditionalSelect. Each possible rou-
tine is always executed regardless of the condition. Based
on the secret value, the correct result is assigned to the
return variable (Figure 2a). This technique is adopted
in modular exponentiation (Square-and-Multiply-always),
scalar multiplication (Double-and-Add-always) and CBC-
MAC-PAD (dummy MAC checking).
This solution is effective against network-level attacks.
However, control flow in result selection can still be
observed by an adversary via host-level attacks. Besides, if
the values of each code path are pre-computed and stored
in memory, the adversary can also infer the secret via data
flow, exemplified by sliding window implementations in
modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication.
AlwaysExecute-BitwiseSelect. This strategy performs all
possible computations, and then selects the correct result
using bitwise operations of secret s (Figure 2b). This
introduces no branches or access patterns. The branchless
Montgomery ladder algorithm adopts this solution for
constant-time conditional swap in scalar multiplication.
4.1.2. Remove Data Flow. Data flow vulnerabilities ex-
ist when different values of the secret s cause different
memory accesses that can be observed by the adversary
(Figure 1b). Two strategies can remove such data flow.
AlwaysAccess-BitwiseSelect. This method accesses all
critical locations, and selects the correct value based on
the bitwise operation (Figure 3a). It is adopted in masked
window modular exponentiation and scalar multiplication.
On-the-fly calculation. We can calculate the value every
time it is used instead of pre-computing all values and
storing them into a table, particularly when the calculation
is not complex and does not introduce secret-dependent
control flows. Branchless Montgomery ladder adopts this
method in the square operation of scalar multiplication.
4.2. Side-channel Information Randomization
4.2.1. Cryptographic Blinding. This solution does not
focus on specific primitives or operations. Instead, it im-
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TABLE 2: The effectiveness of implementations under different adversarial capabilities ( = vulnerable,  = secure)
Category Operation Implementation Network-level Host-level IndexTiming Message Page Cacheline CacheBank Branch µ-ops
Modular Multiplication Basic and Karatsuba multiplication        1.1.1
Modular exponentiation
Square(Double)-and-Multiply(Add)        1.2.1
Scalar multiplication
Square(Double)-and-Multiply(Add)-always        1.2.2
Sliding window        1.2.3
Fixed window        1.2.4
Asymmetric Masked window        1.2.5
Cryptography Montgomery ladder        1.2.6
Branchless montgomery ladder        1.2.7
Modular inverse Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm        1.3.1Extended Euclidean Algorithm        1.3.2
RSA, ElGamal, Key blinding        –
ECDH, ECDSA Plaintext/ciphertext blinding        –
Symmetric Substitution-Permutation T-box lookup        2.1.1Cryptography AES-NI        –
Distribution Sampling Cumulative Distribution Table Sampling        3.1.1Post-Quantum Rejection Sampling        3.1.2
Cryptography Failure Rate Reduction Error Correcting Code        3.2.1
Message Randomization Padding-Hash        3.3.1
RSA-PAD Error message        4.1.1Uniform response message        4.1.2
Protocol
CBC-MAC-PAD
Error message        4.2.1
Padding Uniform response message        4.2.2
Dummy MAC checking        4.2.3
Constant-time compression        4.2.4
proves the high-level asymmetric cipher algorithms. There
are generally two types of blinding techniques.
Key blinding. A random factor is blended into the secret
key, but the original key and the randomized key generate
the same cryptographic result. The adversary can only
obtain the randomized key via side-channel attacks, which
is useless without knowing the blended random factor.
For ECDSA and ECDH, the randomized key is k+sr
where r is a random number and s is the group order.
The scalar multiplication generates (k + sr)G, the same
as kG [39]. For RSA and ElGamal, the randomized key is
d+rφ(n) where r is a random number and φ is the Euler’s
totient function. The decryption gives cd+rφ(n) mod n,
the same as cd mod n. In both cases, the true value of k
is hidden from side-channel adversaries.
Plaintext/ciphertext blinding. This approach randomizes
the plaintexts or ciphertexts, adaptively chosen by the
adversary. The randomized texts cause the adversary to
recover a wrong key via side-channel analysis. This so-
lution works only if correct ciphertexts can be produced
from randomized plaintexts and vice versa.
For ECDSA and ECDH, we can choose a random
point R and use G′ = G + R in computation. The
adversary cannot recover k from the side-channel obser-
vation without the knowledge of R [39], but we can easily
reproduce the correct result kG by subtracting kR from
kG′. For RSA and ElGamal, we can generate a random
value r, and replace c with c ∗ re. Now the decryption
process is randomized to be (c ∗ re)d mod n = cd ∗ red
mod n. To get cd mod n we can simply multiply the
result by r−1, as red ∗ r−1 ≡ 1 mod n.
5. Evaluation of Cryptographic Libraries
From a practical perspective, we review, analyze
and evaluate the development of side-channel attacks
and defenses in two commonly used cryptographic li-
braries: OpenSSL and GNU Crypto (GnuPG, Libgcrypt
and GnuTLS). We collect side-channel related history
(1999 – 2019) from Common Vulnerabilities and Ex-
posures (CVE), changelogs and commit messages, and
source code. Table 3 shows the evolution of the libraries.
The full history is tabulated in Appendix D.
5.1. Vulnerability severity
We examine the severity and practicality of side-
channel attacks as well as the attention developers paid
to them. We establish the measurements for these threats
and compare them with other vulnerability categories.
We adopt the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS)1, an industry standard, to assess each CVE. The
score ranges from 0 (least severe) to 10 (most severe).
We consider the Base score that well represents the in-
herent quality of a vulnerability. It comprises two sub-
scores, Exploitability that defines the difficulty to attack
the software and Impact that defines the level of damage
to certain properties of the software under a successful
attack. Appendix C details computation of these scores.
For OpenSSL and GNU Crypto, the top vulnerabili-
ties are denial-of-service, arbitrary code execution, buffer
overflow, and memory corruption. Figure 4 compares
the average scores and quantities of these vulnerability
categories2. We observe that side-channel vulnerabili-
ties are regarded less severe than other types due to
lower Exploitability and Impact sub-scores. Side-channel
attacks usually require stronger adversarial capabilities, in-
depth knowledge about underlying platforms, and a large
amount of attack sessions, but only cause partial confi-
dentiality breach as they leak (part of) keys or plaintexts.
In contrast, other vulnerabilities may be exploited by less-
experienced attackers, but enable them to execute arbitrary
code or disable the services entirely.
Next we compare side-channel vulnerabilities in two
categories: asymmetric ciphers and protocol padding (we
skip symmetric ciphers and post-quantum cryptography as
fewer vulnerabilities were identified in their libraries). Fig-
ure 5a shows the average CVSS scores of each category.
We observe that vulnerabilities in protocol padding are
generally more severe that those in asymmetric ciphers
1. The latest CVSS version is v3.0. In this paper, we adopt CVSS
v2.0, as old vulnerabilities were not assigned CVSS v3.0 scores.
2. There are some mistakes in CVEs: (1) all side-channel vulnerabil-
ities should only have partial confidentiality impact, while CVE-2003-
0131, CVE-2013-1619 and CVE-2018-16868 were also assigned partial
integrity or availability impact. (2) CVE-2018-10844, CVE-2018-10845
and CVE-2018-10846 should have local access vector, but they were
assigned network access vector. We corrected them in our analysis.
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TABLE 3: Evolution of cryptographic libraries for side-channel activities
Date Version Vulnerable Operations Vulnerable Implementation CVE Countermeasures Index
2001/07/09 0.9.6b RSA-PAD Uniform error message Fix bugs
2003/02/19 0.9.6i, 0.9.7a CBC-MAC-PAD Uniform error message CVE-2003-0078 Dummy checking for TLS 4.2.2.a
2003/04/10 0.9.6j, 0.9.7b Modular multiplication Basic and Karatsuba multiplication CVE-2003-0147 RSA blinding 1.1.1.aRSA-PAD Uniform error message CVE-2003-0131 Uniform version error message 4.1.1.b
2005/07/05 0.9.8 Modular exponentiation Sliding window Fixed window2005/10/11 0.9.7h
2007/10/11 0.9.8f Modular inversion Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm Euclidean Extended Algorithm
2011/09/06 1.0.0e Scalar multiplication Montgomery ladder CVE-2011-1945 Make the bit length of scalar constant 1.2.6.b
2012/01/04
0.9.8s
0.9.8s, 1.0.0f CBC-MAC-PAD Uniform error message CVE-2011-4108 Dummy checking for DTLS 4.2.2.bPadding data initialization CVE-2011-4576 Fix bugs
2012/03/12 0.9.8u, 1.0.0h RSA-PAD (PKCS #7 and CMS) Error message CVE-2012-0884 Uniform error message and dummy checking
2012/03/14 1.0.1 Scalar multiplication Sliding window Masked windowSubstitution-Permutation T-box lookup AES-NI support
2013/02/05 0.9.8y, 1.0.0k, 1.0.1d CBC-MAC-PAD Dummy MAC checking CVE-2013-0169 Dummy data padding 4.2.3.a
2014/04/07 1.0.1g Scalar multiplication Montgomery ladder CVE-2014-0076 Branchless Montgomery ladder 1.2.6.a2014/06/05 0.9.8za, 1.0.0m
2014/10/15 0.9.8zc, 1.0.0o, 1.0.1j CBC-MAC-PAD Error message CVE-2014-3566 Disable fallback of SSLv3.0 4.2.1.b
2016/01/28 1.0.1r, 1.0.2f RSA-PAD Uniform error message
CVE-2015-3197
Disable SSLv2 ciphers 4.1.2.bCVE-2016-0703CVE-2016-0704
CVE-2016-0800
2016/03/01 1.0.1s, 1.0.2g RSA-PAD Uniform error message
CVE-2015-3197
Disable SSLv2 protocols 4.1.2.bCVE-2016-0703CVE-2016-0704
CVE-2016-0800
Modular exponentiation Fixed window CVE-2016-0702 Masked window 1.2.4.a
2016/05/03 1.0.1t, 1.0.2h CBC-MAC-PAD (AES-NI) Dummy data padding CVE-2016-2107 Fix bugs
2016/09/22 1.0.1u, 1.0.2i Modular exponentiation Fixed window CVE-2016-2178 Fix bugs
2018/08/14 1.0.2p, 1.1.0i
Scalar multiplication Branchless Montgomery ladder On-the-fly calculation to replace lookup table
Modular inversion Binary Greatest Common Divisor CVE-2018-0737 Extended Euclidean Algorithm 1.3.1.c
Modulo Early exit ECDSA and DSA blinding
1.1.0i Scalar multiplication Sliding window Branchless Montgomery ladder
2018/09/11 1.1.1
Scalar multiplication
Branchless Montgomery ladder Differential addition-and-doublingCoordinate blinding
Masked window Branchless Montgomery ladder
Sliding window Branchless Montgomery ladder
Modular inversion Extended Euclidean Algorithm Implementing new constant-time function for ECInput blinding
2018/11/20
1.0.2q Scalar multiplication (P-384) Sliding window CVE-2018-5407 Branchless Montgomery ladder 1.2.3.d
1.0.2q, 1.1.0j, 1.1.1a DSA sign setup Space preallocation CVE-2018-0734 Fix bugsScalar multiplication Space preallocation CVE-2018-0735 Fix bugs
2019/02/26 1.0.2r CBC-MAC-PAD Protocol error handling CVE-2019-1559 Fix bugs1.1.1b Modular inversion (EC) Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm EC-specific inversion function with input blinding
(a) OpenSSL
Date Version Vulnerable Operations Vulnerable Implementation CVE Countermeasures Index
2006/09/08 T1.4.3 RSA-PAD Error Message Uniform error message2006/09/21 T1.5.1
2011/06/29 L1.5.0 Substitution-permutation T-box lookup AES-NI support
2012/01/06 T3.0.11 CBC-MAC-PAD Uniform error message CVE-2012-0390 Dummy checking for DTLS 4.2.2.b
2013/02/04 T2.12.23, T3.0.28, T3.1.7 CBC-MAC-PAD Dummy MAC checking CVE-2013-1619 Dummy data padding 4.2.3.a
2013/07/25 P1.4.14, L1.5.3 Modular exponentiation Square-and-Multiply CVE-2013-4242 Square-and-Multiply-always 1.2.1.a
2013/12/16 L1.6.0 Modular exponentiation Square-and-Multiply CVE-2013-4242 Square-and-Multiply-always 1.2.1.a
2013/12/18 P1.4.16 Modular multiplication Basic and Karatsuba multiplication CVE-2013-4576 Exponentiation blinding
2014/08/07 L1.5.4 Modular multiplication Basic and Karatsuba multiplication CVE-2014-5270 Exponentiation blinding
2015/02/27 P1.4.19, L1.6.3 Modular multiplication Basic and Karatsuba multiplication CVE-2014-3591 ElGamal BlindingModular exponentiation Sliding window CVE-2015-0837 Remove control flow of multiply operation 1.2.1.b
2016/02/09 L1.6.5 Scalar multiplication Sliding window CVE-2015-7511 Double-and-Add-always
2016/02/18 L1.5.5
Modular multiplication Basic and Karatsuba multiplication CVE-2014-3591 ElGamal Blinding
2016/04/15 L1.7.0 Modular exponentiation Sliding window CVE-2015-0837 Remove control flow of multiply operation 1.2.1.b
Scalar multiplication Sliding window CVE-2015-7511 Double-and-Add-always
2017/06/29 L1.7.8
Modular exponentiation Sliding window CVE-2017-7526 RSA exponentiation blinding 1.2.3.b2017/07/18 L1.8.0
2017/07/19 P1.4.22
2017/08/27 L1.7.9, L1.8.1 Scalar multiplication Branchless montgomery ladder CVE-2017-0379 Input validation 1.2.7.b
2018/06/13 L1.7.10, L1.8.3 Modulo Early exit CVE-2018-0495 ECDSA blinding
2018/07/16 T3.3.30, T3.5.19, T3.6.3 CBC-MAC-PAD Pseudo constant time
CVE-2018-10844 New variant of pseudo constant timeCVE-2018-10845 (Not fully mitigate the vulnerability)) 4.2.4.cCVE-2018-10846
2018/12/01 T3.6.5 RSA-PAD Pseudo constant time CVE-2018-16868 Hide access pattern and timing 4.1.2.d
(b) GNU crypto (For the version column, P: GnuPG; L: Libgcrypt; T: GnuTLS)
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Fig. 4: CVSS score of different software vulnerabilities.
due to higher Exploitability. The underlying reason is
that Exploitability is determined by access vector and
access complexity (Appendix C). Figure 5b shows the
breakdown of these two factors in each category. For
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Fig. 5: Side-channel vulnerabilities in different operations
access vector, network vector and local vector are neck
and neck for vulnerabilities in asymmetric ciphers, but
the former dominates access vectors of padding oracle
attacks, rendering them more exploitable. For access com-
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Fig. 6: Cumulative distributions of vulnerability windows
plexity, medium access complexity is a majority for both
categories, and the difference between them is not large
enough to significantly affect the score.
5.2. Vulnerability Response
We evaluate the responses to discovered side-channel
vulnerabilities from the cryptographic library developers.
Response speed. For each vulnerability, we measure the
vulnerability window, defined as the duration from the
vulnerability publication date3 to the patch release date.
If the patch release date is earlier than the vulnerability
publication date, the vulnerability window is negative.
Obviously narrower vulnerability window leads to fewer
chances of exploit and less damage.
Figure 6a shows the cumulative distribution of vul-
nerability windows for OpenSSL and GNU Crypto. We
can see that both libraries responded to side-channel
vulnerabilities very actively: 56% and 50% of vulnera-
bilities were fixed by the two libraries respectively before
publication; more than 80% of vulnerabilities were fixed
within one month of their disclosure; each library has
only one case that spanned more than 4 months, the
longest duration being 198 days in GnuPG. Figure 6b
compares the vulnerability windows of different access
vectors. Although network attacks are more severe than
local attacks, they were fixed at similar speeds.
Response coverage. We found that most discovered
vulnerabilities were addressed in OpenSSL and GNU
Crypto, except that host-based padding oracle vulnera-
bilities [92, 104] still exist in both libraries at the time
of writing. One possible reason is that such host attacks
require stronger adversarial capabilities and can only work
in limited contexts, and thus are less severe.
5.3. Cross-branch Patch Consistency
An application usually maintains different develop-
ment branches concurrently. When a vulnerability is dis-
covered, if the corresponding patch is not applied to all
live branches at the same time, then an adversary gets
an chance to attack the unpatched branches. For instance,
OpenSSL replaced the vulnerable sliding window scalar
multiplication with branchless Montgomery ladder in ver-
sion 1.1.0i on August 14, 2018, but not in the 1.0.2 branch.
This left a chance for port-based attacks [68] to work
on the sliding window implementation in OpenSSL 1.0.2,
3. A side-channel vulnerability may be published in different ways,
including online archives, security conferences and journals, and the
CVE system. We use the earliest of all such dates.
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Fig. 7: Number of patches for cross-branch windows
which urged the developers to apply the patch to 1.0.2q
on November 20, 2018.
For each vulnerability, we measure the cross-branch
vulnerability window, defined as the duration from the first
patch release date to the date when all live branches are
patched. Figure 7 shows the number of patches in different
vulnerability windows for both libraries. In most cases, a
patch was applied to all live branches at the same time (0
days). Some patches are however still missing in certain
branches at the time of writing (unpatch). For example,
OpenSSL 1.0.1 introduced masked-window multiplication
and AES-NI support that were never ported to 0.9.8 and
1.0.0 branches before their end of life. OpenSSL 1.0.2r
includes a bug fix for protocol error handling, but it is not
applied to 1.1.0 and 1.1.1. Some new side-channel bug
fixes, not critical though, in OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 1.1.1b are
not included in 1.0.2 and 1.1.0. For GNU Crypto, CVE-
2015-0837 was fixed in GnuPG 1.4.19 and Libgcrypt
1.6.3, but not in Libgcrypt 1.5.x. Fortunately this branch
has reached its end of life on December 31, 2016.
5.4. Countermeasure Type
We study the types of countermeasures commonly
adopted by cryptographic libraries to fix side-channel
vulnerabilities. Four categories are considered: (1) intro-
ducing brand new implementations; (2) selecting existing
secure implementations; (3) fixing software bugs; (4) en-
hancing robustness of existing implementations. Classifi-
cation of countermeasures for OpenSSL and GNU Crypto
is shown in Figure 8.
In the earlier days, OpenSSL mainly introduced new
implementations to fix side-channel vulnerabilities. After
many years’ evolution, each cryptographic operation
has secure implementations, and brand new solutions
become unnecessary. Recent patches were often minor
bug fixes. Besides, previously developers only patched the
code upon revelation of new issues. Now they proactively
fortify the library without the evidence of potential vul-
nerabilities. This definitely improves the security of the
library against side-channel attacks.
GNU Crypto has fewer vulnerabilities and patches
compared to OpenSSL, and prefers using traditional so-
lutions for some common issues. For instance, to miti-
gate the vulnerability in sliding window scalar multiplica-
tion, OpenSSL adopted a new solution, masked-window
multiplication, while Libgcrypt regressed to less efficient
Double-and-Add-always. Besides, development of GNU
Crypto is generally several years behind OpenSSL.
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5.5. Comparisons with Other Libraries
Finally we summarize side-channel CVEs in other
cryptographic applications (Table 4), and compare them
with OpenSSL and GNU Crypto.
Vulnerable Categories. Figure 9a shows the breakdown
of vulnerabilities in different categories. We observe that
side-channel vulnerabilities exist widely in many appli-
cations, in addition to OpenSSL and GNU Crypto. We
believe a lot of unrevealed side-channel vulnerabilities still
exist in various applications, for two reasons.
First, researchers tend to study common cryptographic
libraries, encouraging their developers to continuously im-
prove the code. Other less evaluated applications may still
contain out-of-date vulnerabilities, but their developers are
unaware or ignorant of them. For instance, Bleichenbacher
attack was proposed 20 years ago and has been mitigated
in common libraries like OpenSSL and GnuTLS, but it
still exists in about one third of top 100 Internet domains
including Facebook and PayPal, as well as widely used
products from IBM, Cisco and so on [89].
Second, some attacks such as those against crypto-
graphic primitives or based on micro-architectural con-
tention require the source code to be available, prohibiting
researchers from discovering vulnerabilities in closed-
source applications. For instance, Figure 9a shows that the
majority of vulnerabilities found in closed-source appli-
cations are padding oracles via remote timing or message
side channels, likely because no source code is needed to
experiment with these attacks. We do not know if they also
suffer from padding oracle attacks via micro-architectural
side channels, as current studies [92, 93, 103, 104] evalu-
ated them only on open-source libraries. It is also unclear
if they possess vulnerabilities related to modular or scalar
operations for the similar reason.
Response speed and coverage. Figure 9b compares the
response speeds of different applications. Interestingly,
they all responded to the vulnerabilities very fast. Most
vulnerabilities were published only after the release of
TABLE 4: Vulnerabilities in other applications
Date Application Vulnerable Operations CVE Patch date Index
2001/06/27 OpenSSH, AppGate, ssh-1 RSA-PAD CVE-2001-0361 2001/01/29
2004/12/31 MatrixSSL Modular Multiplication CVE-2004-2682 2004/06/01
2009/08/31 XySSL RSA-PAD CVE-2008-7128 ?
2010/10/20 Apache MyFaces Padding oracle attack CVE-2010-2057 2010/06/10
2010/10/20 Oracle Mojarra Padding oracle attack CVE-2010-4007 2010/06/10
2013/02/08 Rack HMAC comparison CVE-2013-0263 2013/02/07
2013/02/08 Mozilla NSS MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2013-1620 2013/02/14 4.2.2.b
2013/02/08 wolfSSL CyaSSL MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2013-1623 2013/02/05 4.2.2.b
2013/02/08 Bouncy Castle MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2013-1624 2013/02/10 4.2.2.b
2013/10/04 PolarSSL RSA-CRT CVE-2013-5915 2013/10/01
2013/11/17 OpenVPN Padding oracle attack CVE-2013-2061 2013/03/19
2015/07/01 Libcrypt++ Rabin-WilliamsDSA CVE-2015-2141 2015/11/20
2016/04/07 Erlang/OTP MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2015-2774 2015/03/26 4.2.1.b
2016/05/13 Botan MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2015-7827 2015/10/26
2016/05/13 Botan Modular inversion CVE-2016-2849 2016/04/28
2016/07/26 Cavium SDK RSA-CRT CVE-2015-5738 ??
2016/09/03 jose-php HMAC comparison CVE-2016-5429 2016/08/30
2016/10/10 Intel IPP RSA CVE-2016-8100 ??
2016/10/28 Botan RSA-PAD CVE-2016-8871 2016/10/26
2016/12/13 wolfSSL AES T-table lookup CVE-2016-7440 2016/09/26
2017/01/23 Malcolm Fell jwt Hash comparison CVE-2016-7037 2016/09/05
2017/02/13 Crypto++ CVE-2016-3995 2016/09/11
2017/03/03 MatrixSSL RSA-CRT CVE-2016-6882 2016/11/25
2017/03/03 MatrixSSL RSA-PAD CVE-2016-6883 2016/04/18
2017/03/07 Intel QAT RSA-CRT CVE-2017-5681 ??
2017/04/10 Botan MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2015-7824 2015/10/26
2017/04/14 Nettle Modular exponentiation CVE-2016-6489 2016/08/04 1.2.3.e
2017/07/27 Apache HTTP Padding oracle attack CVE-2016-0736 2016/10/20
2017/08/10 Apache CXF MAC comparison CVE-2017-3156 ??
2017/08/20 Nimbus JOSE+JWT Padding oracle attack CVE-2017-12973 2017/06/02
2017/09/25 Botan Modular exponentiation CVE-2017-15533 2017/10/02
2017/12/12 Erlang/OTP RSA-PAD CVE-2017-1000385 2017/11/23
2017/12/12 Bouncy Castle RSA-PAD CVE-2017-13098 2017/12/28 4.1.1.c
2017/12/12 wolfSSL RSA-PAD CVE-2017-13099 2017/10/31 4.1.1.c
2018/01/02 Linaro OP-TEE RSA Montgomery CVE-2017-1000413 2017/07/07
2018/06/04 Bouncy Castle DSA CVE-2016-1000341 2016/12/23
2018/06/04 Bouncy Castle Padding oracle attack CVE-2016-1000345 2016/12/23
2018/06/14 LibreSSL Modulo primitive CVE-2018-12434 2018/06/13
2018/06/14 Botan Modulo primitive CVE-2018-12435 2018/07/02
2018/06/14 wolfssl Modulo primitive CVE-2018-12436 2018/05/27
2018/06/14 LibTomCrypt Modulo primitive CVE-2018-12437 ?
2018/06/14 LibSunEC Modulo primitive CVE-2018-12438 ?
2018/06/14 MatrixSSL Modulo primitive CVE-2018-12439 2018/09/13
2018/06/14 BoringSSL Modulo primitive CVE-2018-12440 ?
2018/07/28 ARM mbed TLS MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2018-0497 2018/07/24
2018/07/28 ARM mbed TLS MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2018-0498 2018/07/24
2018/09/21 Apache Mesos HMAC comparison CVE-2018-8023 2018/07/25
2018/12/03 nettle RSA-PAD CVE-2018-16869 ? 4.1.2.d
2018/12/03 wolfSSL RSA-PAD CVE-2018-16870 2018/12/27 4.1.2.d
2019/03/08 Botan Scalar multiplication CVE-2018-20187 2018/10/01
(a) Open-source libraries
Date Application Vulnerable Operations CVE Patch date Index
2010/09/22 Microsoft IIS Padding oracle attack CVE-2010-3332 2010/09/27
2013/02/08 Opera MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2013-1618 2013/02/13 4.2.2.b
2013/06/21 IBM WebSphere Commerce Padding oracle attack CVE-2013-0523 ??
2014/08/16 IBM WebSphere DataPower - CVE-2014-0852 ??
2014/12/09 F5 BIG-IP MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2014-8730 ??
2015/08/02 Siemens RuggedCom ROS MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2015-5537 ??
2015/11/08 IBM DataPower Gateways Padding oracle attack CVE-2015-7412 ??
2016/04/12 EMC RSA BSAFE RSA-CRT CVE-2016-0887 ??
2016/04/21 CloudForms Management Engine Padding oracle attack CVE-2016-3702 ?
2016/09/08 HPE Integrated Lights-Out 3 Padding oracle attack CVE-2016-4379 2016/08/30 4.2.1.a
2016/12/15 Open-Xchange OX Guard Padding oracle attack CVE-2016-4028 2016/04/21
2017/02/03 EMC RSA BSAFE Padding oracle attack CVE-2016-8217 2017/01/20
2017/03/23 Cloudera Navigator MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2015-4078 ??
2017/06/30 OSCI-Transport Padding oracle attack CVE-2017-10668 ?
2017/08/02 Citrix NetScaler MAC-CBC-PAD CVE-2015-3642 ??
2017/11/17 F5 BIG-IP RSA-PAD CVE-2017-6168 ?? 4.1.1.c
2017/12/13 Citrix NetScaler RSA-PAD CVE-2017-17382 ?? 4.1.1.c
2017/12/13 Radware Alteon RSA-PAD CVE-2017-17427 ?? 4.1.1.c
2017/12/15 Cisco ASA RSA-PAD CVE-2017-12373 2018/01/05 4.1.1.c
2018/01/10 Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS RSA-PAD CVE-2017-17841 ?? 4.1.1.c
2018/02/05 Cavium Nitrox and TurboSSL RSA-PAD CVE-2017-17428 ?? 4.1.1.c
2018/02/07 IBM GSKit Padding oracle attack CVE-2018-1388 ??
2018/02/26 Unisys ClearPath MCP RSA-PAD CVE-2018-5762 ?? 4.1.1.c
2018/05/17 Symantec SSL Visibility RSA-PAD CVE-2017-15533 2018/01/12 4.1.1.c
2018/05/17 Symantec IntelligenceCenter RSA-PAD CVE-2017-18268 ?? 4.1.1.c
2018/07/31 Huawei products RSA-PAD CVE-2017-17174 ??
2018/08/15 Clavister cOS Core RSA-PAD CVE-2018-8753 ??
2018/08/15 ZyXEL ZyWALL/USG RSA-PAD CVE-2018-9129 ??
2018/08/21 Huawei products RSA-PAD CVE-2017-17305 ??
2018/08/31 RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite RSA-PAD CVE-2018-11057 ??
2018/09/11 RSA BSAFE SSL-J RSA-PAD CVE-2018-11069 ??
2018/09/11 RSA BSAFE Crypto-J RSA-PAD CVE-2018-11070 ??
2018/09/12 Intel AMT RSA-PAD CVE-2018-3616 ??
2019/02/22 Citrix NetScaler Gateway Padding oracle attack CVE-2019-6485 ??
(b) Closed-source products
? Whether and when this vulnerability is addressed is not revealed.
?? This vulnerability is addressed, but the date is not revealed.
corresponding patches, leaving no vulnerability windows
for adversaries to exploit.
Regarding the coverage, most discovered vulnerabil-
ities were addressed, with a few exceptions (annotated
with ? in Tables 4a and 4b) where too little public in-
formation is available. For these cases, we are unable to
ascertain whether these issues were solved or not.
6. Insights and Lessons
We draw some insights and suggestions based on the
summarization and evaluation of side-channel vulnera-
bilities and countermeasures. We hope they can benefit
cryptographic software developers, users and researchers.
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6.1. Research Directions
First, we propose several promising opportunities and
directions for future side-channel research.
D1: Identify new vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art
cryptographic implementations, more likely in less-
studied ciphers and operations.
The discovery and exploitation of various side-channel
vulnerabilities during the past decades inspired people
to search for new secure solutions. Now each critical
cryptographic primitive has secure algorithms and imple-
mentations that are robust against different types of side-
channel attacks. Thus, it is interesting to explore new
fundamental vulnerabilities in current implementations.
In addition to the cryptographic operations discussed in
Sec. 3, researchers can focus on other ciphers and op-
erations, and search for new critical vulnerabilities. For
instance, the emerging post-quantum cryptography has
drawn people’s attention for its resistance against quantum
computer based attacks. Different types of post-quantum
algorithms were designed for public key infrastructure,
e.g., hash-based, lattice-based and multivariate cryptogra-
phy. Currently researchers only focus on the side-channel
vulnerabilities in lattice-based cryptography. It is interest-
ing to explore if there are any chances to attack other
types of post-quantum cryptography schemes.
D2: Discover outdated vulnerabilities in less popular
and closed-source applications.
As discussed in Sec. 5.5, old vulnerabilities, espe-
cially those against cryptographic primitives or via micro-
architectural contention, can still exist in real-world appli-
cations. It is worth the research effort to conduct a more
comprehensive evaluation of various side-channel vulner-
abilities on different open-source libraries and commercial
products. This will raise public awareness on side-channel
threats, and more importantly, encourage developers to
secure these applications as a result.
D3: Design new side-channel attack techniques that
can capture finer grained side-channel information,
and study countermeasures for the new attacks.
From Sec. 3 we observe that innovation in provid-
ing adversaries with more detailed information usually
exposes new vulnerabilities. For instance, fixed window
modular exponentiation with scatter-gather approach was
designed to defeat attacks with the granularity of cache
line. However, a new attack method that captures cache-
bank level information [71] invalidated the approach. Pre-
vious countermeasures for padding oracle attacks only
considered remote attacks, and thus they focused on pro-
ducing uniform responses in constant time. Later, host-
based attack techniques were applied to padding oracle
settings [92, 93, 103, 104], compromising such solutions.
We hence propose this research direction so the security
of cryptographic operations can be constantly enhanced.
6.2. Development Recommendations
We offer some suggestions for developers of crypto-
graphic applications and systems to make the implemen-
tations more secure and efficient.
R1: Different countermeasure strategies can have dif-
ferent vulnerability coverages and performance costs.
Developers need to carefully select the optimal strate-
gies for critical operations.
We summarized different countermeasures and their
features in Sec. 4. To remove control flow vulnerabilities,
AlwaysExecute strategies introduce performance overhead
due to execution of all possible code routines. Condition-
alSelect can only defeat remote attacks since it still leaves
a minor secret-dependent control flow, while BitwiseSe-
lect is secure against all known types of attacks.
To remove data flow vulnerabilities, AlwaysAccess-
BitwiseSelect defeats all known types of attacks with the
price of performance degradation from extra memory ac-
cesses. On-the-fly calculation is useful if the computation
does not contain secret-dependent control flows, while
repeated computation causes slowdown.
Cryptographic blinding is a technique dedicated for
asymmetric cryptography such as RSA, ElGamal and
ECC. It is particularly effective in cases where secret-
dependent control flow or data flow is hard to remove
(e.g., modular multiplication). Plaintext/ciphertext blind-
ing can only defeat chosen-input side-channel attacks,
while key blinding does not have this limitation.
R2: Software bugs contribute a lot to side-channel
vulnerabilities. Developers should verify the code cor-
rectness of critical operations prior to release.
Developers may accidentally leave software bugs that
can be exploited to perform side-channel attacks. As
critical cryptographic operations are designed to be more
secure today, adversaries now tend to search such bugs to
break the secure designs and implementations (Sec. 5.4).
There are three common types of side-channel bugs. First,
incorrect flag propagation prevents some cryptographic
operations from calling the securely implemented routine
even though it is already introduced, exemplified by mod-
ular exponentiation [117] and inversion [118]. Second,
some secure implementations are only partly applied to the
operations or primitives, leaving the rest still vulnerable.
For instance, in OpenSSL before version 1.0.2q, most
curves (P-224, P-256 and P-521) adopted secure branch-
less Montgomery ladder or masked window for scalar
multiplication, but P-384 curve still used the insecure
sliding window implementation, offering the adversary an
opportunity to compromise ECDSA [68]. Third, some cor-
ner cases were overlooked during implementation, giving
rise to non-constant runtime behaviors in execution time
[104, 119], message type [53] and format [91].
To verify if the secure routines are selected properly
and applied to all operations or primitives, developers can
insert breakpoints inside the insecure routines and check if
they are reached [78]. To verify if the implementation has
expected constant behaviors, developers can measure the
side-channel information under different cases and check
if they are indistinguishable.
R3: Developers should carefully handle the reported
vulnerabilities. They should (1) prioritize the most
severe vulnerabilities; (2) apply patches to all live
branches at the same time; (3) apply patches to all
vulnerable operations.
From Sec. 5.1 we observe that different types of side-
channel vulnerabilities are assigned with different severity
scores. The network-level vulnerabilities are particularly
severe as they are more exploitable, so developers should
12
pay special attention to those attacks and prioritize their
fixes. Besides, when a vulnerability is disclosed, de-
velopers should apply the corresponding countermeasure
patches to all live branches of the application immediately.
Otherwise, the unpatched branch will remain vulnerable as
the threat is disclosed to the public (Sec. 5.3). Developers
should also check whether the application contains other
implementations sharing the same vulnerability. If so they
should also fix them even though they are not reported.
6.3. Indications in Practice
We draw some conclusions for cryptographic applica-
tion users about side-channel threats and countermeasures
from a practical viewpoint.
I1: Side-channel vulnerabilities are generally consid-
ered less severe compared to other vulnerabilities,
although their volume in CVE database is non-trivial.
As discussed in Sec. 5.1, two reasons make side-
channel threats less severe: the attacks require higher
adversarial capabilities and more domain knowledge, and
the damage is relatively smaller. Thus, the existence of
these vulnerabilities in applications is by no means a
catastrophe to the users and there is no need to panic.
The world has not seen an occurrence of malicious side-
channel attacks that could bring severe damages so far.
I2: Although side-channel vulnerabilities are regarded
as less severe, they are handled very actively, either
in mainstream open-source libraries (Sec. 5.2), less
popular libraries or closed-source products (Sec. 5.5).
Such active attitude towards side-channel threats is
reflected in several aspects. First, new side-channel vul-
nerabilities were fixed at a very fast speed to reduce users’
potential damage. Second, most known side-channel vul-
nerabilities to date were fixed. Third, cryptographic li-
braries are now shifting the countermeasures from brand
new implementations to minor bug fixes and enhancement,
indicating that they are becoming more mature (Sec. 5.4).
I3: It is unnecessary for users to always patch or
upgrade the libraries for the most secure implementa-
tions. They can adopt those suited to their scenarios.
If a use case does not need to consider certain ad-
versarial capabilities, countermeasures designed for them
will not be necessary. For instance, if the application
does not have network interfaces, then the user does
not need to consider network-level side-channels. If the
application does not share the computing platform with
other untrusted parties, then the user does not need to
consider host-level attacks.
7. Related Work
7.1. Physical Attacks
Different from software side-channel attacks, physical
side-channel attacks require the adversary to be local
to the target system running the victim application to
collect the side-channel signals during the application
execution. Different attacks have been proposed against
cryptographic applications [36–40, 120–122]. Some of
them are so powerful that even the application does not
contain secret-dependent control flow or data flow, they
are still able to deduce secrets via intermediate values
[39]. Systematization of these attacks and vulnerabilities
is however not relevant in this paper.
7.2. Attacking Non-cryptographic Applications
In addition to recovering keys in cryptographic opera-
tions, side-channel attacks can also be used to steal other
types of information. At the application level, attacks exist
to identify keystrokes [52, 123–129], application states
and activities [130–132], and websites [133, 134]. At the
system level, adversaries may use side channels to infer
host configurations [135] and memory layout information
[136–139]. Meltdown [140] and Spectre [141] attacks
were disclosed to bypass the isolation and protection
schemes in operating systems, followed by variants of
such attacks [142–147]. Systematization of these attacks
is out of the scope of our work.
7.3. Identification of Vulnerabilities
Various approaches and tools were designed to auto-
matically identify potential side-channel vulnerabilities in
commodity software. Some static methods utilize abstract
interpretation to analyze the source code and measure the
information leakage (bounds) [12, 62, 148–153], while
others verify if a program always exhibits constant-time
behavior by checking whether it contains secret-dependent
control flow or data flow [14–17, 19]. Dynamic meth-
ods profile program execution and measure the correla-
tion between critical secrets and runtime behaviors from
execution traces to capture side-channel vulnerabilities
[18, 74, 92, 154–158].
7.4. Side-channel Surveys
Past efforts summarized side-channel attacks and
countermeasures in different contexts including smart card
[25], networked systems [20, 24], hardware architecture
[28, 29], cloud [26, 27], smartphone [21, 22, 30] and
key logging [23, 31]. They mostly studied side-channel
information collecting techniques for specific attack types
in specific environments. In contrast, our work focuses on
the vulnerabilities in cryptographic implementations.
Closer to our work are efforts [159–161] that studied
side-channel vulnerabilities and countermeasures in Ellip-
tic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC). We distinguish our work
from theirs by considering a wider range of cryptographic
ciphers and protocols than ECC. We also systematically
evaluate the vulnerabilities and countermeasures in differ-
ent applications in addition to reviewing past literature.
8. Conclusion
Side-channel attacks against cryptographic implemen-
tations have been an enduring topic over the past 20 years.
Many vulnerabilities have been discovered from previous
cryptographic implementations, but unknown ones likely
still exist in today’s implementations. The good news is
that the community resolved these vulnerabilities very
actively, and hence large-scale side-channel attacks caus-
ing severe real-world damages haven’t happened so far.
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Besides, years of efforts have fortified common cryp-
tographic libraries and applications against side-channel
attacks, and recently discovered vulnerabilities were less
significant or surprising.
Looking ahead, we expect continuous arms race be-
tween side-channel attacks and defenses. We encourage
researchers to discover new vulnerabilities and attacks,
evaluate them on a wider range of applications, and de-
velop novel countermeasures for them.
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Appendix
1. Cryptographic Ciphers and Protocols
1.1. Elliptic Curve Cryptography. In geometry, an el-
liptic curve is a two-dimensional curve defined by y2 =
x3 + ax+ b. When used in cryptography, we make a few
modifications. We first require 4a3+27b2 6= 0 to exclude
singularity. Additionally we apply the curve over a finite
field, usually with a prime or 2m order, and introduce a
special infinity point ∞. This forms a group of points,
with ∞ as identity element and the + operation defined
as: 1) P +∞ = P ; 2) if P is the reflection of Q over the
x-axis, then P+Q =∞; 3) if P and Q are different points
not in case 2, then the line through P and Q intersects
the curve with another point R, then P +Q = R′ where
R′ is the reflection of R over the x-axis; 4) if P and Q
are the same point, treat “the line through P and Q” as
“the line tangent to the curve at P ” and use case 3. Case
3 and 4 are non-trivial cases and can be computed with
Equation 1. We usually write P+ ...+P as nP , and name
this operation “scalar multiplication”.
λ =

yq−yp
xq−xp , if xq 6= xp
3x2p+a
2yp
, otherwise
xr = λ
2 − xp − xq
yr = λ(xp − xr)− yp
(1)
Elliptic curve can be used in cryptography [45, 46].
Assuming the group has prime order p and generator G,
choose a random integer k from [1, p − 1] as the private
key, then D = kG will be the public key.
Usage in Digital Signature (ECDSA) . To sign message
m, Alice chooses a public hash function h and a secret
nonce n. Compute R = nG mod p, r = Rx (cannot
be zero), and s = k−1(h(m) + kr) mod p, then (r, s)
is the signature. To verify, Bob computes u1 = h(m)s−1
mod p, u2 = rs−1 mod p, Z = u1G+u2D, and z = Zx.
The signature is valid if r ≡ z mod p holds.
Usage in Key Exchange (ECDH) . Assuming Alice uses
private key kA and public key PA = kAG, and Bob
similarly uses key pair (kB , PB), the shared symmetric
key is simply k = kBPA = kAPB = (kAkB)G.
1.2. Key Exchange and Encryption Protocols. In the
handshake protocol, the client first sends a list of cipher
suites csc and a nonce rc. The server responds with a list
of cipher suites css, the server certificate, and a nonce rs.
Then the client picks a cipher cs (e.g., RSA) supported
by both the client and server.
The client generates a random secret string k with byte
length lk as the master key. We require lk 6 ln−11, where
ln is the byte length of n in the server’s public key (n, e).
The client builds a message block m (Equation 2a) using
a non-zero random padding string pad with byte length
ln − 3lk, which is at least 8. Then she encrypts m to get
the ciphertext (Equation 2b).
m = 0x00||0x02||pad||0x00||k (2a)
c ≡ me mod n (2b)
The server decrypts the received ciphertext and vali-
dates if the message format complies with Equation 2a.
If yes, the server sends a finished message to the client,
and the client replies a finished message, marking the
completion of the key exchange of k.
Equation 3 shows how to use CBC-MAC to encrypt
message m with MAC built from a block cipher of block
size b. (1) The MAC HM is calculated over the sequence
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number SEQ, header HDR and message m (Equation 3a).
(2) The plaintext P is created by concatenating m, HM ,
and a padding string pad (Equation 3b) chosen so that the
byte length of P is Nb, where N is an integer. The most
common way is to pad n+1 bytes with each byte value as
n, e.g., 0x02||0x02||0x02. (3) P is divided into a sequence
of blocks of b bytes, p1, p2, ..., pN , and encrypted with
key K (Equation 3c). (4) The text T transmitted over the
network is the concatenation of HDR and each ciphertext
block (Equation 3d).
HM = H((K ⊕ opad)||H((K ⊕ ipad)||SEQ||HDR||m)) (3a)
P = m||HM ||pad (3b)
ci = EncK(ci−1 ⊕ pi); i = 1, 2, ..., N (3c)
T = HDR||c1||c2||..||cN (3d)
The receiver decrypts T and accepts the message m
only if the padding format and MAC are correct.
2. Implementations of Cryptographic Operations
We show the pseudo code of implementations for
different cryptographic operations described in Section 3.
Algorithm 1: Modular Multiplication
Input: x:xk−1xk−2...x0, y:yn−1yn−2...y0
Output: x ∗ y
1 function MULTIPLY(x, y)
2 if SIZE_OF_LIMBS(x) < KARATSUBA_THRESHOLD then
3 r ← MUL_BASECASE(x, y)
4 r ← 0
5 i← 1
6 while i ∗ n ≤ k do
7 t← MUL_KARATSUBA(xi∗n−1...x(i−1)∗n, y)
8 r ← ADD_WITH_OFFSET(r, t, (i− 1) ∗ n)
9 i← i+ 1
10 if i ∗ n > k then
11 t← MULTIPLY(b, ak−1...a(i−1)∗n)
12 r ← ADD_WITH_OFFSET(r, t, (i− 1) ∗ n)
13 return r
14 function MUL_BASECASE(x, y)
15 if y0 = 0 then
16 r ← 0
17 else if y0 = 1 then
18 r ← x
19 else
20 r ← MUL_BY_SINGLE_LIMB(x, y0)
21 for i← 1 to n− 1 do
22 if yi = 1 then
23 r ← ADD_WITH_OFFSET(r, x, i)
24 else if yi > 1 then
25 r ← MUL_AND_ADD_WITH_OFFSET(r, x, yi, i)
26 return r
27 function MUL_KARATSUBA(x, y)
28 if n < KARATSUBA_THRESHOLD then
29 return MUL_BASECASE(a, b)
30 if n mod 2 = 1 then
31 r ← MUL_KARATSUBA(xn−2...x0, yn−2...y0)
32 r ←
MUL_AND_ADD_WITH_OFFSET(r, xn−2...x0, yn−1, n−
1)
33 r ← MUL_AND_ADD_WITH_OFFSET(r, y, xn−1, n− 1)
34 else
35 h← MUL_KARATSUBA(xn−1...xn/2, yn−1...yn/2)
36 t← MUL_KARATSUBA(xn−1...xn/2 −
xn/2−1...x0, yn/2−1...y0 − yn−1...yn/2)
37 l← MUL_KARATSUBA(xn/2−1...x0, yn/2−1...y0)
38 r ← (22∗32∗n+232∗n)∗h+232∗n ∗ t+(232∗n+1)∗ l
39 return r
Algorithm 2: Square-and-Multiply Modular Exponentiation
Input: x, m, y:yn−1yn−2...y0
Output: xy mod m
1 begin
2 r ← 1
3 for i← n− 1 to 0 do
4 r ← SQUARE(r) mod m
5 if yi = 1 then
6 r ← MULTIPLY(r, x) mod m
7 return r
Algorithm 3: Square-and-Multiply-always Modular Exponentiation
Input: x, m, y:yn−1yn−2...y0
Output: xy mod m
1 begin
2 r ← 1
3 for i← n− 1 to 0 do
4 r ← SQUARE(r) mod m
5 r′ ← MULTIPLY(r, x) mod m
6 if yi = 1 then
7 r ← r′
8 return r
Algorithm 4: Sliding Window Modular Exponentiation
Input: x, m, y:wn−1wn−2...w0
Output: xy mod m
1 begin
2 g[0]← x mod m
3 s← SQUARE(g[0]) mod m
4 for i← 1 to 2L−1 − 1 do
5 g[i]← MULTIPLY(g[i− 1], s) mod m
6 r ← 1
7 for i← n− 1 to 0 do
8 for j ← 0 to li − 1 do
9 r ← SQUARE(r) mod m
10 if wi 6= 0 then
11 r ← MULTIPLY(r, g[(wi − 1)/2]) mod m
12 return r
Algorithm 5: Scatter and Gather method
1 s← 8
2 m← 32
3 b← 24
4 function Scatter(mem, g[i])
5 for j ← 0 to b− 1 do
6 for k ← 0 to s− 1 do
7 mem[s ∗m ∗ j + i ∗ 8 + k]← g[i][j ∗ s+ k]
8 function Gather(g[i],mem)
9 for j ← 0 to b− 1 do
10 for k ← 0 to s− 1 do
11 g[i][j ∗ s+ k]← mem[s ∗m ∗ j + i ∗ 8 + k]
Algorithm 6: Masked Window Gather method
1 s← 8
2 m← 32
3 b← 24
4 function Gather(g[i],mem)
5 for j ← 0 to b− 1 do
6 for l← 0 to m− 1 do
7 for k ← 0 to s− 1 do
8 v ← mem[s ∗m ∗ j + l ∗ 8 + k]
9 g[i][j ∗s+k]← g[i][j ∗s+k]|(v&(m == l))
Algorithm 7: Double-and-Add Scalar Multiplication
Input: P , N :nm−1nm−2...n0
Output: NP
1 begin
2 r ← 0
3 for i← m− 1 to 0 do
4 r ← PointDouble(r)
5 if ni = 1 then
6 r ← PointAdd(r, P )
7 return r
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Algorithm 8: Double-and-Add-always Scalar Multiplication
Input: P , N :nm−1nm−2...n0
Output: NP
1 begin
2 r ← 0
3 for i← m− 1 to 0 do
4 r ← PointDouble(r)
5 r′ ← PointAdd(r, P )
6 if ni = 1 then
7 r ← r′
8 return r
Algorithm 9: Sliding Window Scalar Multiplication
Input: P , N
Output: NP
1 begin
2 i← 0
3 while N > 0 do
4 if N mod 2 = 1 then
5 if N mod 2w ≥ 2w−1 then
6 di ← N mod 2w − 2w
7 else
8 di ← N mod 2w
9 N ← N − di
10 else
11 di ← 0
12 N ← N/2
13 i← i+ 1
14 g[0]← P
15 for j ← 1 to 2w−2 − 1 do
16 g[j]← g[j − 1] + P
17 r ← 0
18 for j ← i− 1 to 0 do
19 r ← PointDouble(r)
20 if dj 6= 0 then
21 if dj > 0 then
22 r ← PointAdd(r, g[dj ])
23 else
24 r ← PointAdd(r, Negative(g[−dj ]))
25 return r
Algorithm 10: Montgomery ladder Scalar Multiplication
Input: P , N :nm−1nm−2...n0
Output: NP
1 begin
2 r ← 0
3 r′ ← P
4 for i← m− 1 to 0 do
5 if ni = 0 then
6 r′ ← PointAdd(r, r′)
7 r ← PointDouble(r)
8 else
9 r ← PointAdd(r, r′)
10 r′ ← PointDouble(r′)
11 return r
Algorithm 11: Branchless montgomery ladder Scalar Multiplication
Input: P , N :nm−1nm−2...n0
Output: NP
1 begin
2 r ← 0
3 r′ ← P
4 for i← m− 1 to 0 do
5 ConstSwap(r, r′, ni)
6 r′ ← PointAdd(r, r′)
7 r ← PointDouble(r)
8 ConstSwap(r, r′, ni)
9 return r
Algorithm 12: Binary Extended Euclidean Algorithm
Input: x, m
Output: x−1 mod m
1 begin
2 v ← m
3 u← x
4 p← 1
5 q ← 0
6 while u 6= 0 do
7 while u mod 2 = 0 do
8 u← u/2
9 if p mod 2 = 1 then
10 p← p+m
11 p← p/2
12 while v mod 2 = 0 do
13 v ← v/2
14 if q mod 2 = 1 then
15 q ← q +m
16 q ← q/2
17 if u ≥ v then
18 u← u− v
19 p← p− q
20 else
21 v ← v − u
22 q ← q − p
23 r ← q mod m
24 return r
Algorithm 13: Extended Euclidean Algorithm
Input: x, m
Output: x−1 mod m
1 begin
2 v ← m
3 u← x
4 p← 1
5 q ← 0
6 while u 6= 0 do
7 tmp1 ← v div u
8 tmp2 ← q − tmp1 ∗ p
9 tmp3 ← v − tmp1 ∗ u
10 q ← p
11 p← tmp2
12 v ← u
13 u← tmp3
14 if q < 0 then
15 r ← q +m
16 else
17 r ← q
18 return r
3. CVSS Calculation (version 2.0)
Equation 4 shows the formula of CVSS 2.0 base
metrics. The Base score is determined by two sub-scores:
Exploitability and Impact.
Exploitability measures the difficulty to exploit this
vulnerability. It is affected by three factors: (1) Access
Vector (AV) reflects the location that the attacker needs
to exploit the vulnerability. A farther location is awarded
a higher score. (2) Access Complexity (AC) embodies
the difficulty of the attack required to exploit the vul-
nerability once the adversary gains access to the target
system. Lower complexity is awarded a higher score. (3)
Authentication (AU) measures the number of times the
adversary must authenticate to the system in order to ex-
ploit the vulnerability. Smaller amount of authentications
is awarded a higher scores.
Impact measures how much damage the vulnerability
can incur to the target system. It is evaluated in terms
of three security properties: (1) Confidentiality (CImpact)
refers to the amount of information leaked to the ad-
versary. (2) Integrity (IImpact) refers to the amount of
data that the adversary can tamper with. (3) Availability
(AImpact) measures the loss of access to the system infor-
mation, resources and services. The possible values of the
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TABLE 5: Release history of OpenSSL and GNU Crypto (gray entries contain side-channel patches)
Date 0.9.6 0.9.7 0.9.8 1.0.0 1.0.1 1.0.2 1.1.0 1.1.1
2000/09/24 0.9.6
2001/04/05 0.9.6a
2001/07/09 0.9.6b
2001/12/21 0.9.6c
2002/05/08 0.9.6d
2002/07/30 0.9.6e
2002/08/08 0.9.6f
2002/08/09 0.9.6g
2002/12/05 0.9.6h
2002/12/31 0.9.7
2003/02/19 0.9.6i 0.9.7a
2003/04/10 0.9.6j 0.9.7b
2003/09/30 0.9.6k 0.9.7c
2003/11/04 0.9.6l
2004/03/17 0.9.7d
2004/05/17 0.9.6m
2004/10/25 0.9.7e
2005/03/22 0.9.7f
2005/04/11 0.9.7g
2005/07/05 0.9.8
2005/10/11 0.9.7h 0.9.8a
2005/10/14 0.9.7i
2006/05/04 0.9.7j 0.9.8b
2006/09/05 0.9.7k 0.9.8c
2006/09/28 0.9.7l 0.9.8d
2007/02/23 0.9.8e
2007/10/11 0.9.8f
2007/10/19 0.9.8g
2008/05/28 0.9.8h
2008/09/15 0.9.8i
2009/01/07 0.9.8j
2009/05/25 0.9.8k
2009/11/05 0.9.8l
2010/02/25 0.9.8m
2010/03/24 0.9.8n
2010/03/29 1.0.0
2010/06/01 0.9.8o 1.0.0a
2010/11/16 0.9.8p 1.0.0b
2010/12/02 0.9.8q 1.0.0c
2011/02/08 0.9.8r 1.0.0d
2011/09/06 1.0.0e
2012/01/04 0.9.8s 1.0.0f
2012/01/18 0.9.8t 1.0.0g
2012/03/12 0.9.8u 1.0.0h
2012/03/14 1.0.1
2012/04/19 0.9.8v 1.0.0i 1.0.1a
2012/04/23 0.9.8w
2012/04/26 1.0.1b
2012/05/10 0.9.8x 1.0.0j 1.0.1c
2013/02/05 0.9.8y 1.0.0k 1.0.1d
2013/02/11 1.0.1e
2014/01/06 1.0.0l 1.0.1f
2014/04/07 1.0.1g
2014/06/05 0.9.8za 1.0.0m 1.0.1h
2014/08/06 0.9.8zb 1.0.0n 1.0.1i
2014/10/15 0.9.8zc 1.0.0o 1.0.1j
2015/01/08 0.9.8zd 1.0.0p 1.0.1k
2015/01/15 0.9.8ze 1.0.0q 1.0.1l
2015/01/22 1.0.2
2015/03/19 0.9.8zf 1.0.0r 1.0.1m 1.0.2a
2015/06/11 0.9.8zg 1.0.0s 1.0.1n 1.0.2b
2015/06/12 1.0.1o 1.0.2c
2015/07/09 1.0.1p 1.0.2d
2015/12/03 0.9.8zh 1.0.1q 1.0.2e
2016/01/28 1.0.1r 1.0.2f
2016/03/01 1.0.1s 1.0.2g
2016/03/03 1.0.1t 1.0.2h
2016/08/25 1.1.0
2016/09/22 1.0.1u 1.0.2i 1.1.0a
2016/09/26 1.0.2j 1.1.0b
2016/11/10 1.1.0c
2017/01/26 1.0.2k 1.1.0d
2017/02/16 1.1.0e
2017/05/25 1.0.2l 1.1.0f
2017/11/02 1.0.2m 1.1.0g
2017/12/07 1.0.2n
2018/03/27 1.0.2o 1.1.0h
2018/08/14 1.0.2p 1.1.0i
2018/09/11 1.1.1
2018/11/20 1.0.2q 1.1.0j 1.1.1a
2019/02/26 1.0.2r 1.1.1b
(a) OpenSSL
Date P1.4.x P2.0.x P2.1.x P2.2.x L1.5.x L1.6.x L1.7.x L1.8.x
2011/06/29 1.5.0
2012/12/20 1.4.13
2013/03/18 1.5.1
2013/04/18 1.5.2
2013/05/10 2.0.20
2013/07/25 1.4.14 1.5.3
2013/08/19 2.0.21
2013/10/04 1.4.15 2.0.22
2013/12/16 1.6.0
2013/12/18 1.4.16
2014/01/29 1.6.1
2014/06/03 2.0.23
2014/06/23 1.4.17
2014/06/24 2.0.24
2014/06/30 1.4.18 2.0.25
2014/08/07 1.5.4
2014/08/12 2.0.26
2014/08/21 1.6.2
2014/11/06 2.1.0
2014/12/16 2.1.1
2015/02/11 2.1.2
2015/02/18 2.0.27
2015/02/27 1.4.19 1.6.3
2015/04/11 2.1.3
2015/05/12 2.1.4
2015/06/02 2.0.28
2015/06/11 2.1.5
2015/07/01 2.1.6
2015/08/11 2.1.7
2015/09/08 2.0.29 1.6.4
2015/09/10 2.1.8
2015/10/09 2.1.9
2015/12/04 2.1.10
2015/12/20 1.4.20
2016/01/26 2.1.11
2016/02/09 1.6.5
2016/02/18 1.5.5
2016/03/31 2.0.30
2016/04/15 1.7.0
2016/05/04 2.1.12
2016/06/15 1.7.1
2016/06/16 2.1.13
2016/07/14 2.1.14 1.7.2
2016/08/17 1.4.21 1.5.6 1.6.6 1.7.3
2016/08/18 2.1.15
2016/11/18 2.1.16
2016/12/09 1.7.4
2016/12/15 1.7.5
2016/12/20 2.1.17
2017/01/18 1.7.6
2017/01/23 2.1.18
2017/03/01 2.1.19
2017/04/03 2.1.20
2017/05/15 2.1.21
2017/06/02 1.7.7
2017/06/29 1.7.8
2017/07/18 1.8.0
2017/07/19 1.4.22
2017/07/28 2.1.22
2017/08/09 2.1.23
2017/08/27 1.7.9 1.8.1
2017/08/28 2.2.0
2017/09/19 2.2.1
2017/11/07 2.2.2
2017/11/20 2.2.3
2017/12/13 1.8.2
2017/12/20 2.2.4
2017/12/29 2.0.31
2018/02/22 2.2.5
2018/04/09 2.2.6
2018/05/02 2.2.7
2018/06/08 2.2.8
2018/06/11 1.4.23
2018/06/13 1.7.10 1.8.3
2018/07/12 2.2.9
2018/08/30 2.2.10
2018/10/26 1.8.4
2018/11/06 2.2.11
2018/12/14 2.2.12
2019/02/12 2.2.13
(b) GNU Crypto
three metrics can be none, partial breach, and complete
breach.
Base =
{
0, if Impact = 0
(0.6 ∗ Impact+ 0.4 ∗ Exploitability − 1.5) ∗ 1.176, otherwise
Exploitability = 20 ∗ AV ∗ AC ∗ AU
Impact = 10.41 ∗ [1− (1− CImpact) ∗ (1− IImpact) ∗ (1− AImpact)]
AV = 0.395 (local) /0.646 (adjacent network) /1 (network)
AC = 0.35 (high) /0.61 (medium) /0.71 (low)
AU = 0.45 (multiple) /0.56 (single) /0.704 (no)
CImpact = 0 (none) /0.275 (partial) /0.66 (complete)
IImpact = 0 (none) /0.275 (partial) /0.66 (complete)
AImpact = 0 (none) /0.275 (partial) /0.66 (complete)
(4)
4. Release history of cryptographic libraries
Table 5 shows the release history of OpenSSL and
GNU Crypto libraries for the past years. We highlight the
released versions containing side-channel patches in gray.
For OpenSSL, we observe that it keeps maintaining
about three live branches concurrently throughout the
history. The patches of most vulnerabilities were applied
to all live branches at the same time. Thus, OpenSSL
has good cross-branch patch consistency for side-channel
vulnerabilities.
The case of GNU Crypto is more complicated. We
ignore GnuTLS as it has too many branches and ver-
sions. Libgcrypt was previously a module inside GnuPG
for cryptographic primitives, but later detached itself to
become an independent library. As a result, some GnuPG
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branches (1.4) continued to keep this module, while others
(2.0, 2.1) did not. Also, some implementations of the same
operations in GnuPG and Libgcrypt differed significantly.
Thus, side-channel patches across libraries and branches
appeared fairly inconsistent.
Disclaimer
The views expressed herein are solely the views of
the author(s) and are not necessarily the views of Two
Sigma Investments, LP or any of its affiliates. They are
not intended to provide, and should not be relied upon for,
investment advice.
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